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INSURANCE-RECOVERY-DELAY OF INSURANCE COMPANY IN REJECTING 
APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE-Plaintiff, designated as beneficiary by deceased 
life insurance applicant, sued defendant life insurance company in as-
sumpsit. Deceased, a combat pilot in the Korean War, had applied for 
one of defendant's policies, passed the medical examination, and made 
several premium payments on the policy. After the applicant was killed in 
combat defendant refused payment, contending that it had never accepted 
the risk but that it had responded to the application with a counter offer 
containing an aviation waiver. Because of ·the applicant's frequent change 
of address and his early death this proposal had never been communi-
cated to him. On appeal from the lower court's directed verdict for de-
fendant, held, judgment vacated and case remanded for new trial. The 
evidence was sufficient to send to the jury the question whether a con-
tract of insurance had resulted prior to applicant's death.1 Wadsworth v. 
New York Life Insurance Company, 349 Mich. 240, 84 N.W. (2d) 513 (1957). 
The subject of delay on the part of an insurance company in handling 
an insurance application has caused much comment in the law reviews.2 
Since an application for insurance would seem to be no more than an 
offer,3 finding the delaying insurance company bound would appear to be in· 
1 Since there was evidence which might have warranted the inference that an actual 
contract had resulted prior to applicant's death it is unlikely that many courts would 
have reached a different holding on these facts. However, for the purpose of guiding the 
retrial of the case, the court commented on the consequences of delay in rejecting an 
application for insurance. In extended dictum the court accepted the "contract theory,'' 
imposing a contract as a matter of law when an insurance company fails to reject an 
application for insurance within a reasonable time. It thus follows the views of a very 
small minority of jurisdictions. See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 487 (1953). 
2 Prosser, "Delay in Acting on an Application for Insurance," 3 UNIV . .Cm. L. REv. 39 
(1935); Funk, "The .Duty of an Insurer To Act Promptly on Applications," 75 UNIV. PA. 
L. REv. 207 (1927); notes and comments, 11 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 230 (1931); 48 DICK. L. 
REv. 51 (1943); 1955 INS. L. J. 441; 20 IOWA L. REV. 165 (1934); 23 MARQ. L. REv. 28 (1938); 
32 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1934). 
3 Hayes v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 198 Va. 67~, 96 S.E. (2d) 109 (1957). 
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conflict with traditional contract law.4 Thus, most courts which have held 
the insurance company liable5 have employed the so-called tort theory,6 
under which the delay in acting upon the insurance application is consid-
ered actionable negligence. Although a finding of duty is prerequisite to a 
holding of negligence, 7 courts have had difficulty in discovering a duty of 
the insurance company to reject applications promptly. Some courts have 
found a duty arising out of the retention of premiums by the insurance com-
pany. 8 Others have found the duty simply by referring to the peculiar na-
ture of the insurance business and the possibility of irretrievable loss to the 
individual.9 Use has been made of the general tort principle that one who 
undertakes a course of action for another is liable for negligence in that ac-
tion.10 In cases where the delay is caused by the insurance agent acting in the 
scope of his authority, his negligence may be charged to his principal.11 A 
few courts hold that the state's grant of a franchise to the insurance com-
pany obligates the company to provide speedy and efficient insurance serv-
ice to the public.12 Aside from the problem of finding a duty, the tort theory 
involves several other difficulties. The problem of proximate cause has 
proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for some courts,13 while others ap-
proach it with the traditional "but for" test, arguing that the damage to the 
applicant was caused by his having been prevented from obtaining insur-
ance elsewhere while he could still have done so.14 Since the duty, if one 
exists, would seem to be to the applicant, most courts consider the tort as 
committed against the applicant;15 consequently it has been questioned 
whether the applicant is actually damaged by the lack of insurance at the 
time of his death, since he never was to receive any of the proceeds of the 
policy.16 Also the argument that no cause of action accrued to the applicant 
4 Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 Conn. 526, 165 A. 686 (1933). 
5 It must be realized that there is substantial authority disallowing any recovery 
in cases of this nature. See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 487 (1953). 
6 See 32 A.L.'R. (2d) 487 (1953). 
7 Burks v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., (D.C. Ga. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 140, affd. 
(5th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 643, cert. den. 343 U.S. 915 (1952). 
8 DeFord v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 P. 1049 (1924). But see Hayes 
v. Durham Life Ins. Co., note 3 supra. 
o Coffey v. Polimeni, (9th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 539. 
10 See concurring opinion in Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 
P. 1009 (1918). 
11 Stark v. Pioneer Casualty Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 34 P. (2d) 731 (1934), noted in 
23 CALIF. L. REv. 215 (1934). 
12Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 P. 151 (1922). 
See 27 HARv. L. REv. 92 (1913). 
13 It is often held that the damage is proximately caused by the happening of the 
contingency rather than by the inaction of the insurance company. See Munger v. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., (D.C. Mo. 1933) 2 F. Supp. 914. 
14 Wyble v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc., (La. App. 1955) 83 S. (2d) 785. 
15Smith v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 Cal. App. (2d) 581, 195 P. (2d) 457 (1948); 
Burks v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., note 7 supra. 
16 Thornton v. Order of Mechanics, 110 W. Va. 412, 158 S.E. 507 (1931). 
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during his life is not without some force.17 From the point of view of 
incidence of damage it would appear only reasonable to consider the 
tort as one committed against the intended beneficiary;18 however, it is 
very difficult to find a duty to the beneficiary. The measure of damages 
has generally been the face amount of the policy applied for,19 rather than 
the premiums paid. Some courts have found contributory negligence of the 
applicant in his failure to make an inquiry or to procure insurance else-
where after a reasonable time has elapsed.20 A very small group of cases 
allows recovery on a contract theory.21 Under this approach, which is 
favored by the principal case in extended dictum, silence of the insurance 
company over an unreasonable period of time is held to amount to an 
implied acceptance, binding the company to the contract applied for.22 
Most courts, however, reject this view as being in conflict with established 
principles of contract law,23 for normally after the expiration of a rea-
sonable period of time an offeror should consider his offer rejected rather 
than accepted.24 The contract theory has the advantage of providing 
logical certainty as to the measure of damages and the identity of the 
person damaged and entitled to recovery;25 therefore, at least in these 
respects, it would appear to be preferable to the tort theory of recov-
ery. The cases have not favored estoppel arguments.26 Courts have 
questioned whether an applicant can reasonably consider the retention 
of his application equivalent to an acceptance of it,27 and have doubted 
that his failure to seek insurance elsewhere was induced by the insurance 
company.28 Many cases are complicated by additional factors. It appears to 
be the general practice of insurance companies to issue a "binder"29 at 
17 See Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 295 Ill. 381, 129 N.E. 191 (1920). 
18 See Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940). 
19 While this would appear to be a contract measure of damages, courts have held 
that the loss suffered was the value of the policy applied for. Mann v. Policyholders' Nat. 
Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 724, 51 N.W. (2d) 853 (1952). 
20 Wyble v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc., note 14 supra. 
21 See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 487 (1953). It has also ,been suggested that there is an implied 
contract to decide promptly whether to accept or reject ,the risk. See Travellers Insurance 
Co. v. Taliaferro, 176 Okla. 242, 54 P. (2d) 1069 (1935). 
22 See Harvey v. United Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 227, 245 P. (2d) 1185 (1952). 
23 Compare Hayes v. Durham Life Ins. Co., note 3 supra, with 1 CONTRACTS REsTATE-
MENT §72 (1932), where silence is :held to ·be an acceptance when accompanied by acts 
of dominion over things offered to the offeree. 
24,More v. N.Y. Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 537, 29 N.E. 757 (1892). 
25 The measure of damages would clearly be the face amount of -the policy. Also, this 
view would allow recovery ,by the intended beneficiary rather than by the estate of the 
deceased applicant. 
26 Paulk v. State ,Mut. Life Ins. Co., 85 Ga. App. 413, 69 S.E. (2d) 777 (1952). 
27 See Reed v. Prudential Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 90, 73 S.W. (2d) 1027 (1934). 
28Zielinski v. General American Life J:ns. Co., (Mo. App. 1936) 96 S.W. (2d) 1059. 
29 "The memorandum of an agreement for insurance intended to give temporary 
protection pending investigation of the risk and issuance of a formal policy." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY, 4th ed., p. 213 (1951). 
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the time of application when the premium is paid in advance.80 The 
argument that such binders create -temporary contracts of insurance has 
been made with a degree of success31 which varies with the court and the 
wording of the binding receipt. Another misleading practice is the cus-
tomary requirement that renewal premiums must be paid on the anni-
versary of the date of application rather than of the date of final accep-
tance. 82 Thus it would seem that an insurance company could help to 
avoid liability in some of these cases by being as precise as possible in its 
dealings with applicants. Public policy, of course, is a vital factor in these 
cases. Arguments can be made on both sides of the controversy.33 While 
the public interest in the prompt availability of insurance should not be 
underestimated, the interest in maintaining low insurance rates is perhaps 
as great.34 The attempts to apply inapplicable· existing doctrine to these 
cases frequently can be considered judicial legislation;35 and in view of the 
persistence of the problem, it would seem to be desirable for the legisla-
tures to act in this field. 
Harry D. Krause, S.Ed. 
so See comments, 44 YALE L. J. 1223 (1935); 63 YALE L. J. 523 (1954). 
81 See Rabb v. Public Nat. Ins. Co., (6th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 940; Killpack v. 
National Old Line Ins. Co., (10th Cir. 1956) 229 F. (2d) 851. See also 107 A.L.R. 194 
(1937); 60 HARv. L. REv. 1164 (1947). 
82 It is generally held, however, that receipt of premiums does not abrogate the 
necessity for acceptance and issuance of a policy. See Reese v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 
(5th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 793. Nor is the circumstance that the offer was solicited by 
the insurance company regarded as relevant. See Patten v. Continental Cas. Co., 162 
Ohio St. 18, 120 N.E. (2d) 441 (1954). 
33 It must be remembered that in the usual case a widow or orphans appear as 
plaintiffs. 
34 It is apparent that the other policy holders are paying for each recovery in cases 
of this nature, either by higher future rates or by having less funds available to secure 
their policies. 
85 See Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 154 Miss. 89, 121 S. 487 (1929). 
